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ABSTRACT 
Colombia is the largest recipient of U.S. monetary and military aid in Latin 
America.  As the U.S. enters its sixth year in the war on terror, the U.S. Navy has 
a unique opportunity to support Colombia and redefine maritime security 
operations.  This thesis will discuss shifting conventional naval forces away from 
traditional roles into the realm of irregular warfare.  With the creation of Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command, the Navy has an irregular warfare force 
capable of conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).  This force, if deployed to 
Colombia, would re-energize not only U.S. efforts to combat the war on drugs, 
but also simultaneously support Colombian efforts in counter-insurgency.  By 
analyzing policy, doctrine, and conventional naval forces, this thesis will 
emphasize the need to expand the role of the U.S. Navy to include FID, thereby 
reducing operational burdens of U.S. Special Forces.  With three to five years of 
dedicated emphasis on irregular warfare, the U.S. Navy will have the capability to 
execute FID in Colombia.  This shift to irregular warfare will build Colombian 
capacity, enhance regional maritime security, combat drugs, and help to fight 
insurgency in Colombia.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 On March 24, 2009, Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, U.S. Joint Forces 
Command Chief, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that American 
“forces must develop a mastery of the irregular fight on par with our conventional 
and nuclear capabilities.”1 General Mattis wants U.S. military officials to build into 
the general force irregular warfare expertise that “makes them adaptable to 
however the enemy chooses to fight.”2 General-purpose forces need to be able 
to conduct missions currently being accomplished uniquely by U.S. special 
operators.  “We are working closely with U.S. Special Operations Command and 
the services to export traditional special operations forces expertise to our 
general purpose forces.”3  
 These statements about using conventional forces to conduct FID were 
never truer than in Colombia.  As Latin America's oldest and most stable 
democracy, Colombia has experienced civil war, insurgency, and terrorism.  
Major Christopher Muller describes in his master’s thesis, USMILGRP Colombia:  
Transforming Security Cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism: 
The current internal security issues have plagued Colombia for 
more than half a century.  They began with the election of a 
conservative president in 1946 and exploded on the 9th of April, 
1948 with the assassination of a populist liberal politician with 
presidential aspirations, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. His murder triggered 
the initial violence which killed 2,000 in Bogotá and eventually 
claimed 200,000 lives over the next 18 years in what became 
known as La Violencia.  Aside from the catastrophic number of 
deaths, La Violencia was also responsible for spinning off the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) as a by-product. 
Subsequently, several other guerrilla groups arose in Colombia. In 
1964, the National Liberation Army (Ejército deLiberación Nacional 
 
1 John T. Bennet, “Mattis: Irregular War Must be a Core Competency,” Navy Times, March 




                                           
– ELN) mimicked the revolutionary Marxists model created by Fidel 
Castro in Cuba. In 1974, the M-19, which mirrored the Tupamaros 
in Uruguay, formed after the former military dictator Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla charged electoral fraud in the presidential election of April 
19, 1970. In 1997, various illegitimate paramilitary groups came 
together to form the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). 
These groups were originally created in the 1960’s to provide 
security to large landowners and cattle ranchers, while other 
paramilitary groups provided security for the narco-traffickers. 
Since 2002, when Alvaro Uribe became president, the Colombian 
Military (COLMIL) has taken the fight to the FARC, the ELN, and 
the AUC. In 2005, FARC strength was estimated at 11,445 fighters 
(reduced from a previous high of approximately 18,000) and the 
organization had an annual income of over US$340 million. The 
current demobilization of the AUC has theoretically eliminated the 
once formidable paramilitary organization. However, various 
criminal organizations have grown from the pre-existing AUC 
networks and they now resemble a narcotrafficking organization in 
both organization and function….These three groups are on the 
U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list, the equivalent of 
America’s Most Wanted for terrorist organizations. Their inclusion 
on this list allows Washington to fund a variety of programs in 
Colombia that target the activities of these groups.4 
 As the United States marks its sixth anniversary in support of Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO), the Colombian government “has been fighting 
insurgents, international crime and terrorism for the past five decades.”5  There 
has never been a better time for the U.S. military to transform itself into an 
irregular warfare (IW) force than now. 
 U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Mulbury asks in his article, “When 
should general purpose forces (GPF) conduct foreign internal defense (FID)?”  
FID is defined by Joint Doctrine as “the participation by civilian and military 
agencies of government in any action, programs taken by another government or 
designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, 
 
4 Christopher W. Muller, “USMILGRP Colombia:  Transforming Security Cooperation in the 
Global War on Terrorism”  (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 1-3. 
5 Ibid., 1. 
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lawlessness, and insurgency.”6  U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) is 
currently conducting all of these missions.  Lieutenant Colonel Mulbury argues 
that while U.S Army SOF should continue to conduct FID during small-scale 
operations, it is far more important that GPF execute FID for large-scale 
operations.7 He notes that an operation such as Combined Joint Task Force–
Horn of Africa (JTF_HOA) is an excellent example of a general-purpose role in 
FID.  “JTF-HOA is one example where SOF is not required for successful FID 
operations.”8  
 However, while Mulbury discusses U.S. Army GPF in FID, this thesis will 
examine how the U.S. Navy can apply these principles to assist GPF in 
Colombia.  Expanding the role of conventional U.S. Naval forces in FID within the 
region, and specifically Colombia, would assist in the larger scale of maritime 
security operations. Assigning units from the Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command and allowing those units to conduct FID missions with the Colombian 
Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps dramatically increase interservice 
coordination between Colombia and United States.   
 In addition, it would also bolster U.S. effectiveness in the war on drugs, as 
increased cooperation would no doubt lead to increased drug seizures. Finally, 
this would strengthen the Colombian Navy’s abilities to deal with counter-
insurgency and terrorism along coastal and inland waterways.  The results would 
be a win-win for both the United States and Colombia.   
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 




6 John Mulbury, “ARSOF, General Purpose Forces and FID: Who Does What, Where and 
When?” Special Warfare 21, issue 1 (2008): 16-21, 
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/assets/08Jan.pdf (accessed September 15, 2008). 
7 Ibid., 21. 
8 Ibid. 
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This research will examine ways the conventional U.S. Naval forces can conduct 
operations in irregular warfare roles, such as FID in Colombia, and redefine 
maritime security operations in the region. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to analyze and explain how conventional 
U.S. Naval forces could successfully conduct FID in Colombia to support U.S. 
security interests, relieve the U.S. Special Forces of some operational pressures, 
and bolster Colombian Navy and Marine Corps efforts against insurgents and 
drug traffickers.    
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Using conventional U.S. Naval forces to conduct FID in Colombia would 
remove some of the operational pressures on the U.S. Special Forces9 and 
could alter the shape of the Latin American maritime security environment.  In 
this context, this thesis will focus on how and why conventional U.S. Naval forces 
might be used to conduct FID in Colombia as a means of implementing the 21st 
Century Seapower Strategy.  If implemented, this would expand the capabilities 
of U.S. Navy conventional forces, as well as develop a potential partnership with 
a vital ally in a region where we have few.  
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 This thesis will examine the use of conventional U.S. Naval forces to 
conduct FID in an effort to slow the flow of drugs and contain the insurgency in 
Colombia.  Chapter II will provide a summary of the security challenges that the 
Colombians have faced over the past twenty years—specifically, drug trafficking, 
and insurgents. It will also address the Colombian response to each of these 
threats. Chapter III will describe the doctrine and policies related to FID, 
Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCETS), and the 21st Century Maritime 
 
9 Bennet, “Mattis: Irregular War.”  
 5
Security strategy.  Chapter IV will introduce the concept of irregular warfare and 
describe the forces and capabilities within Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC). Chapter V will discuss the particular restraints that make 
conducting FID in Colombia a challenge.  Finally, Chapter VI will provide 
recommendations for the use of conventional U.S. naval forces to assist the 
Colombian government in conducting counter-drug and counter-insurgency 
operations. In addition, it will summarize the argument for why NECC forces are 
uniquely suited to conduct FID.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will consist of a review of U.S. National Defense Strategy, 
maritime strategy, U.S. military publications including the Joint Forces doctrine, 
U.S. Army Special Forces field manuals, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps 
instructions in relation to Colombia.  The examination of three unrelated Naval 
Postgraduate School theses help to explain why conventional U.S. Naval forces 
should be used to assist in the Colombian counter-drug and counter-insurgency 
campaigns.  Research includes interviews and dialogue with U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Marine Corps personnel in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami, 
Florida.  Their experience and expertise in Colombia, along with data from the 
past two decades of naval missions in the area, have supplied information critical 
to this research.   
 6
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II. THE COLOMBIAN PROBLEM  
A. DRUGS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING   
 International drug trafficking is one of the greatest challenges to the 
security of Central America and the United States.  During the past 30 years, 
drug use has remained either steady or increased in both developing and 
undeveloped nations.  Despite international efforts to slow the distribution and 
manufacture of illegal drugs, production has responded to an increased demand.  
Corruption has affected many governments in the Andean region of Latin 
America as a result of the drug trade. This, in turn, has affected relationships 
between governments at the international level. The United States has 
historically been the largest consumer of illegal drugs in the western hemisphere.  
Illegal drugs processed in the Andes transit through Central America and Mexico 
on their way to UNITED STATES markets.10  As Figure 1 illustrates, Colombia is 
a starting point for drugs bound for the U.S, and the main mode of transportation 
from Colombia is either small high-speed watercraft, semi-submersibles, or land 










10 Cecile Marin, Map of Drug Trafficking routes though Central America, 
http://mondediplo.com/maps/drugs (accessed 20 May 2008). 
11 “U.S. Navy Mission in Colombia,” United States Embassy, Bogota Colombia (February 
2009). 
 
Figure 1.   Major drug routes in Latin America (From UN World Drug Report, 
2008) 
Typically, foreign investors are reluctant to place their money in a country 
that has corruption, drug problems, an unstable economy, and/or political unrest.  
Colombia has suffered the impact that drugs and drug trafficking have had on the 
lack of economic development through foreign investment.  The World Bank 
claims that criminal violence costs Latin America more than $30 billion a year.12  
 Drug trafficking is much like a global corporation; it has very complex 
relationships, a high degree of coordination and control, and is very rational in its 
pursuit of market strategies.  Drug traffickers oversee a very dynamic process 
from the purchase and transportation of raw materials, to the processing and 
exportation to United States and European markets, and finally to the distribution 
of profits where the money is then laundered. Despite political conditions, a 
                                            
12 Luis Esteban G. Manrique, “A Parallel Power: Organized Crime in Latin America,” Real 




                                           
difficult terrain, and vast distances, drug trafficking organizations simultaneously 
coordinate these activities.  In spite of international efforts, legal reforms, and 
expanding law enforcement agencies, the production of cocaine and other illegal 
substances has continued to increase.13  Until better ways can be found to 
defeat the illegal drug market, there will always be drugs, mainly cocaine, flowing 
from Colombia to the United States. 
B. INSURGENCY 
 The Colombian government and military have been fighting a 
counterinsurgency campaign within the borders of Colombia for almost fifty 
years.  While over twenty armed groups have been identified, two are the most 
prominent, effective, and organized. They are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC-EP) and National Liberation Army–ELN.     
1. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–FARC-EP  
 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) originated during a 
period in Colombian history known as La Violencia. La Violencia, which started in 
1948, was a ten-year war between the Liberals and the Conservatives that 
resulted in over 200,000 deaths.  By 1968, the FARC had approximately 10,000 
members and established a Marxist-Lenin ideology under the leadership of 
Pedro Antonio Marin, a.k.a. Manuel Marulanda.  When Marulanda died in 2008, 
Alfonso Cano replaced him.14   
 By the 1980s, the FARC was responsible for the majority of kidnappings 
and extortions committed in Colombia, as well as 15% of the 35,000 deaths.15 
The FARC has kidnapped numerous Colombian officials, police officers, and 
wealthy Colombians, including presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was 
 
13 Manrique, “A parallel power,” 5.  
14 Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Center of 
Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ farc.cfm (accessed December 15, 2008). 
15 Ibid., 1. 
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rescued in July 2008.16  Kidnap and ransom of their prisoners is a both source of 
income and a form of control over the population.  In addition to their success 
with kidnapping, a large portion of their funding comes from their involvement in 
the drug trade.  The FARC is involved in “every stage of drug trafficking from 
taxing the cultivators of the coca and poppy plants, to controlling the 
manufacturing laboratories and even distributing the drugs themselves.”17 Profits 
from cocaine and heroin range anywhere from $100 million to $1 billion annually 
and are used to purchase arms, attract new recruits, and fund FARC operations. 
The profit from the sale of illegal drugs makes the FARC one of the richest 
insurgent groups in the world.    
 The government of Colombia has attempted several times to negotiate 
peace with the FARC the latest attempt occurring between 1998 and 2001, 
during Colombian President Andŕes Pastrana’s administration. President 
Pastrana granted the FARC a 42,000 square mile “cleared zone” or “despeje,” 
which was a demand by FARC as a precondition for the talks (see Figure 1).  
However, the FARC used the ceasefire agreement to rebuild and stage 
kidnappings, run drug operations, recruit, and train young guerillas.  In 2001, 
after the FARC hijacked an airliner, President Pastrana broke off the talks and 







16 Cable News Network, “Betancourt: Rescue is a 'miracle,” July 3, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/Americas/07/02/betancourt.scene/index.html (accessed 15 
December 2008),1  
17 Garcia, “In the Spotlight.”  
18 Ibid., 1. 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Guerrilla DMZ and Operations (From BBC News, 2008) 
2. National Liberation Army–ELN 
 The National Liberation Army (ELN) is the second largest guerrilla group 
in Colombia and, like the FARC, espouses Marxist-Leninist ideology.  In the 
1990’s the ELN “had evolved from a localized peripheral conflict to one of 
pervasive violence.”19  At present, ELN forces have an estimated 3,500 
combatants, compared to around 10,000 in the FARC.  Inspired by the Cuban 
Revolution of 1959, the ELN formed in 1964, “when a group of students, inspired 
                                            
19 Shaw Choy, “In the Spotlight: The National Liberation Army ELN,” June 21, 2002, Center 
of Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/eln.cfm (accessed December 15, 2008). 
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by Che Guevara and led by Fabio Vasquez Castaňo, returned from their training 
in Cuba.”20 After the death of Fabio Vasquez, Catholic priests led the ELN.   
 The ELN prefers kidnapping and extortion to the use of drug money for its 
funding. By 2001, the ELN was holding 800 hostages for ransom. The ELN 
targets mostly employees of foreign petroleum corporations, blaming them for 
Colombia’s weak domestic economy, endemic poverty, and severe income 
inequality.21 Unlike the FARC, the ELN has shown a greater willingness to 
negotiate for peace. With the election of Colombian President Andres Pastrana in 
1998, the ELN began negotiations with the Colombian government.  However, 
when the FARC peace process failed, “it became harder for the ELN to dictate its 
demands.”22    
C. COLOMBIA’S RESPONSE TO DRUGS AND INSURGENTS 
 Under President Pastrana, the peace process between the Colombian 
government and insurgents collapsed in 2001.  Facing declining political and 
popular support, an increase in military activities, and human rights abuses by 
every armed group, President Pastrana signed the Security and National 
Defense Bill in to law.23     
This ‘antiterrorist’ measure was passed in part because of growing 
complaints by the armed forces and their allies that the new 
human-rights laws and institutions were hindering their ability to 
prosecute the law.24 
 Chernick notes that the Security and National Defense Bill “strengthened 
the military justice system, gave judicial autonomy and subordinated civilian 
officials with specific emergency zones that could be declared to confront 
 
20 Choy, “In the spotlight,” 1. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Marc C. Chernick, “Colombia: Does Injustice Cause Violence?” in What Justice? Whose 
Justice?, eds. Susan Eva Eckstein and Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley (Berkley: University of 
California Press 2003), 203. 
24 Ibid. 
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terrorism.” The passing of the bill led to an outcry from the United Nations and 
international human rights organizations who declared the law a direct violation 
of international treaty commitments already in place within Colombia.  The failure 
of the FARC peace process allowed Pastrana’s successor, Alvaro Uribe Veléz, to 
take a hard line against guerrillas. This was bolstered by Plan Colombia, a 
$6 billion upgrade to Colombian military and police capabilities.  Alvaro Uribe 
Veléz, an uncompromising foe of Colombia guerrilla insurgents, was so popular 
in Colombia that he won an unprecedented first round electoral victory in 2002 by 
a landslide.  Upon taking office, “he declared a ‘State of Internal Commotion,’ 
which granted him emergency powers that allowed him to give the military the 
right to arrest, detain, and search people without judicial authority.”25 
 Because the Colombian people were eager for change and progress, 
President Uribe was able to institute aggressive reform and expansion of the 
armed forces and police.  In June 2003, President Uribe announced the “Policy 
for Defense and Democratic Security” that became the cornerstone of his plan to 
establish long-term control of national territory that was currently being controlled 
by guerrillas or paramilitaries. To fund his policy, President Uribe raised taxes on 
businesses and wealthy Colombians to the tune of over $1 billion.  These funds 
supplemented the defense budget, funded the modernization of equipment, and 
increased salaries for the military and police.  He also created the “Soldados de 
mi Pueblo”, a civil defense force used for local security enforcement, freeing up 
the military.26  “The Democratic Security plan called for better coordination of 
security entities in order to fight “terrorism” and crime, counter illegal drugs, 
better protect border area, and fight corruption,” notes Colombia expert Peter 
DeShazo.  In short, President Uribe was taking the fight to the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries.  By 2004, overall security in the country began to improve.  The 
Colombian army took the offensive against guerillas and paramilitary groups in 
occupied areas that had not seen government presence in over two decades.  
 
25 Chernick, “Colombia: Does Injustice Cause Violence?” 203. 
26 Ibid., 12. 
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Large numbers of FARC and ELN members were killed, forced to surrender, or 
demobilized, and civilian deaths began to decline. By 2004, every Colombian 
municipality had at least a nominal police presence.27   
 As guerilla and paramilitary numbers were declining, the Colombian 
government was also experiencing success with counter-drug operations in the 
region.  Plan Colombia funded large-scale aerial eradication of cocoa fields, and 
in 2002-2003, 15-21% of cocoa was eradicated.28  There was also a sustained 
interdiction program, which met with some success.  While the centerpiece of 
Plan Colombia focused on counter-drug incentives, a recent article from the BBC 
news reported that of the $600 million U.S. dollars Colombia receives each year, 
most goes toward military aid to fight the insurgency rather than for counter-drug 
efforts.29 
1.  Cerrando Espacios—Closing the Gap  
The mission of the Colombian Navy in the war against narco-
trafficking is TO CLOSE THE GAP that the narcoterrorists have 
opened in our seas, rivers and coast in order to economically 
eliminate the terrorism that affects the nation.30 
The Colombian Navy (COLNAV) and Colombian Marine Corps (COLMAR) 
have a different force structure than most western militaries.  The COLNAV is 
comprised of approximately 24,000 personnel; however, it includes about 18,000 
members of the COLMAR.  This often makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
forces.  Simply stated, the COLNAV is responsible for seas and coasts while the 
COLMAR is responsible for the rivers.  The COLNAV has bases in Cartagena, 
Bahia Malaga, Buenaventura, Puerto Leguizamo, and San Andres where the 
 
27 Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani, and Phillip McLean, Back from the Brink Evaluating 
Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007: A Report of the Americas Program, 13, www.csis.org 
(accessed March 2008). 
28 Ibid. 
29 British Broadcast Corporation, “US Weighs Costs of Plan Colombia,” BBC News, 
November 7, 2008, 12:50:26 GMT, (accessed December 14, 2008). 
30 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Estrategia Naval Contra el Narcoterrorismo, (Colombia, 
June 2007). http://www.armada.mil.co (accessed September 13, 2008), 3. 
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majority of its surface and naval air forces are stationed.  This provides 
Colombian maritime security coverage of both the Caribbean and Pacific.  The 
COLNAV uses frigates, patrol boats, and aircraft to conduct maritime security 
operations. However, constraints on the Colombian defense budget have made it 
difficult for both services to conduct maritime security operations due to a lack of 
joint and logistical support. Despite this, both services have made an impact on 
drug trafficking in the region.31    
 The COLMAR represents 81 percent of the COLNAV.  It is also the 
world’s second largest Marine Corps (U.S. Marine Corps being the first) and has 
the world’s largest riverine force.32 The COLMAR is organized into three Riverine 
Brigades, one Training Brigade, and a Special Forces Battalion.  Despite 
representing a majority in the COLNAV, the COLMAR receives little support from 
their Naval Command.33  Although the COLMAR is subservient to the COLNAV, 
all three of its Riverine brigades are engaged in counter-drug and counter-
terrorism operations.  The Estrategia Naval Contra el Narcoterrorismo fills in the 
gaps left by these forces.    
Colombia’s Estrategia Naval Contra el Narcoterrorismo (Navy Strategy 
Against Narcoterrorism) of June 2007 outlines the navy’s plan to deny narco-
terrorists the use of maritime, river, and land areas under the responsibility of the 
Colombian Navy (COLNAV).  In the past, narco-terrorists have used these areas 
to import arms, munitions, and other contraband imported to assist the 
narcoterrorists in their illegal endeavors.  The COLNAV’s Estrategia Naval 
Contra el Narcoterrorismo focuses on enhancing their naval presence in 
Colombia’s three main operating areas: the Pacific Ocean, the Caribbean Sea 
and Colombia’s rivers.  By focusing its effects on these three environments, the 
COLNAV will turn the tide on narcoterrorism in Colombia.  Through 
 
31 “U.S. Navy Mission in Colombia,” United States Embassy, Bogota Colombia, COLNAV 
Situational Update,  FY09 Quarterly brief (April 2009). 
32 “U.S. Navy Mission in Colombia,” United States Embassy, Bogota Colombia, COLMAR 
Situational Update,  FY09 Quarterly brief (February 2009). 
33 Ibid., 2. 
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modernization, maintenance, and acquisition of naval and air assets, the 
Colombian Navy seeks to improve its effectiveness in joint and combined 
operations while enhancing and achieving a robust logistical support system.34            
Between January 2000 and December 2006, the COLNAV captured or killed 
some 5,641 narcoterrorists in its waters.35  The COLNAV has also been 
extremely successful at seizing large amounts of cocaine; in a four-month period 
in 2007, the COLNAV seized 24.244 kilograms of cocaine estimated to have a 
value of $606 million U.S. dollars.36  These and many other seizures prove that 
the COLNAV is committed to stopping narcoterrorists by denying them safe 
refuge and pursuing them to bring them to justice, not just for the security of the 
Colombian people, but for the security of the region.  The size of the maritime 
security region makes the assistance of conventional U.S. naval forces in the 
region vital to Colombia’s continued success.    
 
34 “Armada Nacional de Colombia. Estrategia Naval Contra el Narcoterrorismo, (Colombia, 
June 2007). http://www.armada.mil.co (accessed September 13, 2008), 4. 
35 Ibid., 55. 
36 Ibid. 
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III. U.S. DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY  
Historically, most Latin American ports have welcomed U.S. naval ships.  
Port visits offer opportunities to support U.S. diplomacy, host protocol events, 
allow for navy-to-navy professional engagement, provide crew rest, and assist 
with humanitarian projects.  One should note that while conventionally powered 
ships are openly greeted in Latin American ports, visits by nuclear powered 
vessels remain problematic.  The most notable incident was in 1986 when the 
foreign ministry of Mexico approved a port visit for the USS Salt Lake City, 
without realizing it was nuclear powered.37 To avoid future controversy, the U.S. 
Navy has only conducted port visits with conventionally powered vessels since 
this incident.  Port visits have been highly successful and achieved with minimal 
expense.  At sea exercises include entering and leaving port, in port training, and 
multi-ship maneuvers.  Once in port, ships often conduct community relations 
projects that establish positive public support, but it is only sustained for a few 
days or weeks.  In some cases, it may be months or years before another U.S. 
Naval vessel visits the region.38  
A. U.S. NAVAL MISSION IN COLOMBIA  
The U.S. Naval Mission (NAVMIS) in Colombia is responsible for 
coordinating all U.S. Naval services to support, train, equip, and advise the 
COLNAV, COLMAR and Colombia Coast Guard (COLCG) in all areas of naval 
operations.  These include maritime interdiction, riverine and littoral warfare, 
aviation, submarine warfare, naval intelligence, special warfare, and 
oceanography.39  The NAVMIS primary focus is support of riverine operations 
 
37 Margaret D. Hayes, Richard D. Kohout, Patrick H Roth, and Gary Wheatley, Future Naval 
Cooperation with Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessments. 32. 
38 Ibid., 36-37.  
39 “U.S. Navy Mission in Colombia,” United States Embassy, Bogota Colombia, (February 
2009). 
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and maritime interdiction.  To date, the NAVMIS has supported riverine 
operations by enhancing communications, assisting with spare parts acquisition, 
establishing a “train the trainer” program, developing infrastructure such as piers 
and barracks, and developing a Regional Training Center for Riverine, Jungle 
and Irregular Warfare (IW).40  In maritime interdiction, the NAVMIS has been 
instrumental in assisting the COLNAV and COLCG by providing training and 
equipment necessary to interdict illegal drugs at sea.  Some of this equipment 
includes hidden compartment detection kits, chemical narcotic identifications kits, 
handheld Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), and other law enforcement 
equipment.  This is essential to make forces more effective in stopping drugs and 
other contraband in the region.41   
B. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) 
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 
any of the action programs taken by another government…to free 
and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and 
insurgency.42 
 The Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for FID is the 
governing document for all FID operations in the U.S. military.  It states that FID 
is the ultimate instrument of U.S. national strategy, and it directs all FID activities 
by supporting U.S. national interests.  FID operations use diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic means to support the internal security 
efforts of any host nation requesting U.S. support.  In order for other security 
efforts to be effective, whether diplomatic, informational, or economic, the use of 
the military is often necessary to ensure a safe and secure environment within a 
 
40 “U.S. Navy Mission in Colombia,” United States Embassy, Bogota Colombia, COLMAR 
Situational Update,  FY09 Quarterly brief (February 2009). 
41 Ibid., 1. 
42 U.S. Joint Staff (2004). Joint Pub. 3-07.1: JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense.  Norfolk: 
Government Printing Office, x. 
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host nation.43  U.S. military provides Direct Support (Not involving Combat 
Operations) (see Figure 1) when host nation security threats are such that it 
cannot sufficiently provide for its own security needs.44  It is in the role of Direct 
Support that using conventional forces over U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) is of greater utility, especially while the U.S. military is conducting OCO 
globally.  
1. Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations) 
Direct Support of host nations means that U.S. forces have direct 
interaction with the military and civilian populations of the nation.  This support 
includes arms and equipment transfers, civil military operations, intelligence 
sharing, and logistical support.  It is important to note that despite the U.S. 
transfer of arms and equipment, the training to use those systems does not 
necessarily involve U.S. forces.45  Direct Support operations can involve several 
different types of military operations simultaneously.  These operations include 
Civil Military (CIVMIL), Psychological (PSYOPS), military training, and logistics. 
 CIVMIL operations are any military related civic action such as foreign 
humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, or reconstruction in 
support of the host nation's internal defense.  PSYOPS involves engaging the 
local population to support the host nation’s desires by accounting for the 
emotions and attitudes of the locals.46 The objective of PSYOPS in FID is to 




43 U.S. Joint Staff (2004). Joint Pub. 3-07.1: JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense.  Norfolk: 
Government Printing Office, ix. 
44 Ibid., I-11. 
45 Ibid., x. 
46 Ibid., xiv. 
States and its allies.”47 It is in these roles that conventional U.S. Naval forces 
could be used to support the COLNAV and COLMAR in Colombia; this will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
 
DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT
OPERATIONS) IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
Humanitarian Assistance









Civil Affairs / Psychological Operations
influences all areas
 
Figure 3.   Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations) (After JTTP3-07.1 
for Foreign Internal Defense, 2004) 
2. Conventional Forces 
Although U.S. Special Operations Command is legislatively-
mandated to conduct FID, which it does as a core task, other 
designated DOD conventional forces may contain and employ 
organic capabilities to conduct limited FID indirect support, direct 
support, and combat operations.48  
                                            
47 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub. 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Norfolk:  
Government Printing Office, 2003), xxi. 
48 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub. 3-07.1: JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (Norfolk: 




unit integrity between host nations and U.S. forces and establish higher 
                                           
It is this provision of the JTTP that allows the U.S. Navy actively expand 
its role in FID.  This expansion could support U.S. SOF and host nations 
simultaneously.  In future OCO, FID will be in high demand, and the need for 
conventional U.S. Naval forces to execute these missions when ordered requires 
the U.S. Navy to begin training personnel now.   
C. JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING  
The U.S. SOF community uses Joint Combined Exchange Training 
(JCET) programs to improve the combat and humanitarian capabilities of both a 
host nation and U.S. forces.49  In 1991, the U.S. Congress created section 2011 
of U.S. Code title, and JCET’s became law.  This law allows the Special 
Operations Command to deploy and train U.S. SOF with foreign security forces 
and grants the authority to pay for any expenses that the host nation cannot 
afford.  These expenses can include, but are not limited to rations, fuel, 
ammunition, and any transportation costs.  JCETS have historically consisted of 
a relatively small number of U.S. SOF, numbering 12-100 personnel.  Their 
training packages consist of SOF mission essential tasks that provide training for 
both the U.S. and the host nation.50  These tasks normally focus on combat 
readiness.  However, they are directly related to regional stability efforts in the 
theater in which they are being executed.  JCET training also includes 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations, civil affair projects, and 
                      
JCETS are very flexible and effective because U.S. SOF personnel 
possess the technical, language, and cultural skills necessary to provide detailed 
training missions to the host nation.  These skills allow SOF to create common 
 
49 George C. Saner and Dan J. Poulos, “JCETS in the Pacific,” 
http://www.specialoperations.com/Focus/jcet.html. (accessed 27 April 2009), 2. 
50 John Rudy and Ivan Eland, “Special Operations Military Training Abroad and Its Dangers.” 
CATO Institute, 22 June 1999, no. 53., http://www.cato.com (accessed 27 April 2009), 2.  
51 Saner and Poulos, “JCETS in the Pacific,” 3. 
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professional standards for all parties concerned.52  As U.S. Army Lt. Col. Saner 
and Sgt First Class Poulos noted in their article, JCETS in the Pacific:  
JCETs act as a force multiplier in support of a host nation’s 
capabilities to react to situations requiring exceptional sensitivity, 
including non-combat operations such as humanitarian assistance, 
security assistance, and peace operations.53             
JCET missions are very popular in many nations around the world; over 
100 nations have taken part in the JCET program.54  These missions are very 
appealing because they offer professional training and support with little or no 
cost to the host nation.  JCET mission packages are the ideal starting point for 
conventional U.S. Naval forces to begin conducting FID and implementing the 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. 
D.  U.S. 21ST CENTURY MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY 
U.S. Naval Forces have a long tradition of conducting expeditionary and 
Irregular Warfare (IW) missions around the world.  A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower highlights the U.S. Navy’s ability to merge traditional 
capabilities with non-traditional or irregular capabilities to combat emerging 
threats.   It states that strategic imperatives can be accomplished through the 
regional focus of concentrated maritime forces with credible power or mission 
tailored combat forces.  This strategy outlines and highlights traditional and 
irregular capabilities and mission areas:55 
 Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. 
 Deter major power war 
 Win our nation’s wars  
 Contribute to homeland defense in depth 
 
52 Saner and Poulos, “JCETS in the Pacific,” 3. 
53 George C. Saner and Dan J. Poulos, “JCETS in the Pacific,” 4. 
54 Ibid. 
55 U.S. Navy, Maritime Strategy: A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower. 
Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC: 2007. www.navy.mil (accessed July 28, 2008).  
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 Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners 
 Prevent or contain local disruption before they impact the global system 
 
It is the last four strategic imperatives: winning our nation’s wars (including 
OCO), contributing to homeland defense, fostering cooperative relationships with 
international partners, and preventing or containing local disruptions that found 
the basis of Irregular Warfare (IW) and are supported by FID operations.  The 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower will prevent or contain local 
disruptions that represent unique challenges in IW.  U.S. Naval forces could be 
tailored to any of these specific operations in an IW campaign.  These naval 
forces exist today in the U.S. Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC).  
However, the U.S. Navy must develop and optimize these IW forces to meet 
current and emerging threats and increase its competency advantage in an IW 
campaign. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Each of these missions, doctrines, and strategies is intertwined and 
culminates with the implementation of the U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower.  This comprehensive strategy focuses on not only classic 
naval missions, but also embraces the role of irregular warfare in the realm of 
modern naval warfare. In addition, it paves the way for conventional U.S. Naval 
forces to conduct full-scale FID operations and support the Colombian Navy and 
Marine Corps in non-combat roles.  The next chapter will introduce the concept 
of Irregular Warfare (IW) and describe the forces and capabilities within Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) uniquely suited to conduct FID in a 
non-combat role in Colombia. 
 24
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IV. U.S NAVY’S IRREGULAR WARFARE FORCE 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines irregular warfare (IW) as:  
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy 
and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare 
favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ 
the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an 
adversary's power, influence, and will. It is also referred to as IW.56 
IW encompasses all of the capabilities and concepts indentified as key 
elements for which the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower was 
developed.57  Its core missions include: forward presence, deterrence, sea 
control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian/disaster response. 
In July 2008, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations stated in NAVADMIN 
212/08, “the establishment of the Navy Office of IW and chartered this office to 
institutionalize all U.S. Navy efforts in IW missions of counter-terrorism (CT), 
Counter-Insurgency (COIN), and supporting missions of Information Operations 
(IO), Intelligence operations, FID, and unconventional warfare as they apply to 
CT and COIN.”  With the establishment of Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC), the U.S. Navy has adapted to address the missions of IW.   
Coordination with U.S. Combatant Commanders about these capabilities with 
NECC is uniquely suited to coordinate and meet the requirements for combating 
terrorism and counterinsurgents and highlights the opportunities for the U.S. 
Navy to contribute abroad. 58 
 
56 U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html (accessed 1 April 2009).  
57 U.S. Navy message, NAVADMIN 212/08, www.npc.navy.mil (accessed 1 April 2009). 
58 Ibid. 
A. NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND (NECC) 
Established in June 2006, NECC consolidates and integrates all the U.S. 
Navy’s expeditionary capabilities under a single command.59 This alignment of 
NECC units represents a dynamic group of forces that are illustrated in Figure 4.  
This organization is responsible for all expeditionary forces and is capable of 
supporting the following missions: waterborne & onshore anti-terrorism force 
protection, theater security cooperation and engagement, and humanitarian or 
disaster relief.60   
3UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
US Navy Irregular Warfare:
Organizations







 Fleet support to Irregular Warfare
– Maritime Security Operations
– Security Cooperation
– Expeditionary ISR and IO












Figure 4.   U.S. Navy Irregular Warfare Organization (From Irregular Warfare 
Working Group Outbrief, n.d.) 
As Figure 5 on the next page illustrates, NECC provides U.S. Combatant 
Commanders with rapidly deployable expeditionary forces that have an array of 
capabilities to support expeditionary and irregular warfare operations globally.  
                                            
59 U.S. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil 
(accessed April 4, 2009). 
60 Ibid., 1. 
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NECC forces operate in areas where the Joint Force Maritime Competent 
Commander (JFMCC) and the Joint Force Land Component Commander 
(JFLCC) battle spaces overlap: in the littorals, inland waterways and rivers, and 
inland near shore regions of the battle space or area of interest.  NECC forces 
provide a greater spectrum to the war fighter in support for Combat Arms 
(Riverines), to Combat Service (EOD, NCF, MESF) to Combat Service Support 
(MCA, NAVELSG, etc.) and provide partner nations training in a variety of 
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Figure 5.   NECC Maritime Functions and Capabilities (From Irregular Warfare 
Working Group Outbrief, n.d.) 
NECC forces are divided into unique functional areas within the U.S. Navy 
that allow Combatant Commanders to specifically tailor forces for IW missions in 
their area of responsibility.  These units can deploy as a self contained and self-
                                            




                                           
supporting entity or as a task force.  This adds to a commander’s ability to 
influence a multitude of security missions within a host nation. This flexibility 
makes NECC units uniquely qualified to conduct FID within the U.S Navy 
because commanders can employ the number of sailors necessary to complete 
mission requirements.   
1. Riverine Force 
Navy Riverines are the Navy’s premier force for patrolling the gaps 
in the seams of Maritime security. We operate along inland 
waterways projecting combat force when necessary and providing 
persistent presence as part of the Navy’s support to Irregular 
Warfare operations and the Long War on Terror.62   
Activated on 25 May 2006, Riverine Group 1 (RIVGRU) and Riverine 
Squadron 1 (RIVRON 1) became the foundation for providing NECC an offensive 
component to brown water operating areas.63  Since 2006, two additional 
Riverine Squadrons (RIVRON 2 & 3) have been supporting maritime security and 
joint operations around the globe.  A Riverine Squadron consists of three 
detachments, each with its own combatant watercraft, tactical vehicles, and other 
maritime systems that can be configured to operate in a hostile riverine 
environment. The riverine watercraft has multiple crews for near continuous 
operation and has the ability to carry small tactical units for waterborne insertion 
and extraction on the river.64 These specially designed riverine craft (Figure 7) 
allow the riverine squadrons to adapt to a wide variety of missions.  A 
headquarters element also provides organic command, control, communications, 
computers and intelligence (C4I), force protection, and logistics.65   
 
 
62 NECC – Riverine Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed April 4, 2009). 
63 The author has first-hand experience within Riverine Squadron 1, serving as an Assistant 
Officer-in-Charge from its establishment and deploying to Iraq in 2007 on the first deployment of 
U.S. Riverine forces in 30 years. 
64 NECC – Riverine Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil, (accessed April 4, 2009). 
65 Ibid. 
Riverine Squadrons missions include, but are not limited to the following: 
 Theater Security Cooperation 
 Humanitarian Assistance in riverine areas of operations 
 Conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO), providing riverine area 
control and denial through protection of critical infrastructure, preventing the 
flow of contraband, and disrupting movement of enemy forces or supplies on 
rivers and waterways 
 Enables power projection by providing fire support through either direct fire or 
coordination of supporting fires and insertion/extraction of joint and coalition 
ground forces 
 
United States Navy Riverines
USN Riverine Craft
Riverine Patrol Boat (RPB)
Riverine Assault Boat (RAB) Riverine Command Boat (RCB)
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC)
Unclassified  
Figure 6.   U.S. Navy Riverine Craft (From U.S. Navy Riverine Force: Capabilities 
Brief, 2008) 
The modern U.S. Riverine Force has the ability to conduct FID, COIN, 
maritime security, non-combat, and combat operations against small tactical, 
waterborne and unconventional warfare units in a riparian (brown water) 
environment.66 
                                            
66 NECC – Riverine Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil, (accessed April 4, 2009). 
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2. Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces (MESF) 
The Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) is responsible for 
protecting and defending the green water operating area for NECC and the 
Navy.67  MESF is an adaptive force that allows commanders to deploy units to 
provide security for naval and logistical forces from the maritime domain onto 
land.68    
The main mission of MESF is force protection.  These units provide 
security for strategic shipping and naval vessels operating in the inshore and 
coastal areas, anchorages and harbors.  They can also conduct Visit, Board, 
Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations against vessels suspected of carrying 
contraband, and when enlarged into Maritime Expeditionary Security Groups 
(MESG), can provide intelligence and communications allowing MESF units to 
protect maritime assets worldwide.69 
3. Naval Construction Forces (Seabees) 
Although not an irregular warfare force, Seabees are a force provider for 
irregular warfare units.  Seabees have the organic capability to provide military 
construction assets in support of operating forces by building roads, bridges, 
bunkers, airfields, and logistics bases in remote regions of the world.  Seabees 
can also provide support for disaster preparation and recovery.  The most 
important role Seabees can have in FID is completing civic action projects that 
complement nation-building programs, such as hospitals, clinic, wells, and 
schools.  Seabees are also trained in infantry style tactics this allows them to 
protect both their projects and themselves should the security environment call 
for it.70 
 
67 In joint planning Blue water = open ocean, green water = littorals or inshore and brown 
water = rivers. 
68 NECC – MESF Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed April 4, 2009). 
69 Ibid. 
70 NECC – Seabee Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed April 4, 2009). 
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4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
U.S. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is recognized for 
countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), and all bomb disposal type missions. EOD detachments are capable of 
operating around the world and are some of the most highly trained sailors in the 
U.S. Navy.71  The EOD community is capable of supporting forces worldwide.  
Allowing EOD personnel to share their expertise and experience at the 
Colombian Anti-Explosive School in Montes de Maria would benefit the 
COLMAR.72  EOD personnel working with the COLMAR in a supporting role 
would undoubtedly save Colombian lives, both military and civilian, from the 
threats of land mines laid by the FARC. 
5. Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) 
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) provides all the 
organic logistics capabilities for Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
and the U.S. Navy within the maritime environment.  Like all units in NECC, 
NAVELSG has the ability to adapt to mission requirements as directed by the 
combatant commander.73  This agility allows NAVELSG to meet the unique 
requirements of FID missions and remain adaptable to new requirements that 
may evolve. 
6. Maritime Civil Affairs (MCA) 
Maritime civil affairs (MCA) forces “provide assistance with the restoration 
of local infrastructures in the aftermath of military operations or natural and man-
made disasters, and participate in regional engagement activities intended to 
 
71 NECC – EOD Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed April 4, 2009). 
72 “U.S. Navy Mission in Colombia,” United States Embassy, Bogota Colombia, COLMAR 
Situational Update, FY09 Quarterly brief (February 2009), 1. 
73 NECC – NAVELSG Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed April 4, 2009). 
build support for the U.S. government.”74  These units are comprised of the 
Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) and two Maritime CA Squadrons (MCAS), 
each with a command staff, and Maritime Civil Affairs Teams (MCAT) capable of 
fulfilling their functional roles both afloat and ashore.  There are also eight 
reserve MCATs for each squadron.75 
 
NECC Adaptive, Responsive, Relevant, Expeditionary
NECC Force Mission Areas
• Maritime Civil Affairs
– Assess, plan and coordinate civil/military 
operations in the maritime environment
• Major combatant and non-combatant 
evacuations
• Maritime operations
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief
• Refugee operations
– Regionally aligned and focused
– Host nation interagency coordination
– U.S. Country Team coordination
Link
Civil affairs enhance security and stability
 
Figure 7.   Maritime Civil Affairs (From NECC brief, 2007) 
Maritime civil affairs squadrons support 16 core functional skills and 3 
maritime specific areas.76  Figure 7 above summarizes these function areas: 
 Public Administration Public Works and Utilities     Emergency Services 
Public Education Public Communication        Environmental Management 
Public Safety  Food and Agriculture        Cultural Relations 
                                            
74 NECC – MCAG Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed April 4, 2009). 




                                           
Civilian Supply  Dislocated Civilians        Public Health 
Public Transportation  Economic Development       Civil Information 
International & Domestic Law  
 The three maritime specific functional areas are as follows:  
Port Operations  
Harbor, Channel Construction and Maintenance  
Marine & Fisheries Resources 
The MCA is the most critical part of FID operations and their functionality 
would represent ‘center of gravity’ for NECC forces conducting FID within a host 
nation.  This single unit’s ‘soft power’ influence on the local population within the 
host nation would undoubtedly be very well received.  Especially in areas of 
Colombia where government control is weak or non-existent, an MCA presence 
could bolster local support for the Colombian government and turn the tide 
against drug lords’ and insurgents’ control of a region.  
7. Expeditionary Diving and Salvage 
The Diving and Salvage community represent by the far the smallest 
community of active duty personnel within NECC, with a number of divers just 
under 500.77  Navy expeditionary divers are divided into two distinct groups, 
Mobile Diving and Salvage Units and Underwater Construction Teams.  Both 
groups are manned with highly trained and technical proficient personnel whose 
missions include; harbor clearance, underwater salvage and recovery, 
underwater ship repair and maintenance, search and rescue, submarine rescue 
operations and hyperbaric medicine.78  NECC divers are also trained to conduct 
diving operations in any conditions from the tropics to the arctic.  
 
77 NECC. Diving Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed 4 April 2009), 2. 
78 Ibid., 1. 
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a. Mobile Diving and Salvage Units (MDSU) 
MDSU divers are primarily trained to conduct underwater rigging and other 
salvage techniques that would allow them to raise heavy objects from the depths.  
These divers use a mixed gas breathing system of helium and oxygen that allow 
them to work at seawater depths of 300 feet in order to recover objects from the 
ocean floor.79   
b. Underwater Construction Teams (UCT) 
The UCT community has approximately 150 Seabee personnel who serve 
in two UCTs, with Naval Construction Regiments and other Navy commands.80  
UCTs continue the Naval Construction mission below the waterline.  UCTs are 
capable of conducting inspections and maintenance on piers, mooring systems, 
wharfs, bridges, and construction on any facilities that have contact with the 
water.  UCTs allow Seabees to “bring organic underwater construction 
capabilities and equipment to both conventional and Special Operation force in 
the battlefield.”81    
8. Engagement  
Every aspect of FID involves engagement with the host nation, in this 
case, Colombia.  Engagement is a main objective of FID operations and cannot 
be underestimated or taken for granted.  NECC’s engagement capabilities 
involve not only the forces mentioned but also include the Foreign Military 
Training Center, Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center, and Expeditionary 
Medical Training.  All of these units combined are key elements of foreign military 
training and will strengthen relations with and the capabilities of the Colombian 
maritime forces. However, before these units set off on advising missions with 
Colombia, the U.S. Navy must first establish adequate doctrine and training that 
 
79 NECC. Diving Fact Sheet, http://www.necc.navy.mil (accessed 4 April 2009), 2. 
80 Ibid., 2 
81 Ibid., 2. 
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applies to Naval Advising.  This Naval Advising doctrine must be specifically 
tailored to FID missions that involve naval forces.   
While the NAVMIS in Colombia has been limited to training and advising, 
it is the scale of NECC’s involvement that will enhance the COLNAV and 
COLMAR capabilities. It can accomplish this by simultaneously providing Direct 
Support to multiple security issues.  Riverine training (combat water survival, 
riverine tactics, boat handling, etc.), MESF harbor security and interdiction 
training, EOD training, NAVELSG logistical support and training, and Seabees 
working military and civilian construction projects in remote locales while 
engaging the population with MCAGs, are all areas where the Colombian military 
requires assistance. By conducting FID, NECC forces will be assisting in the 
expansion of Colombian capabilities and creating the capacity for them to 
operate within their own borders to combat drugs and insurgency in the maritime 
environment.   
B. CONCLUSION  
Allowing NECC forces to assist the Colombian Navy and Marine Corps in 
training and logistical roles would expand the boundaries of Colombian maritime 
security.  By closing the gaps in Colombian training and combat support roles, 
NECC forces would play an active part in Colombian maritime strategy, thereby 
enhancing the Colombian effort against drugs and insurgents.  Initially, NECC 
forces would be conducting FID in a Direct Support role, supplementing U.S. 
Special Forces personnel in their traditional role as advisors before conducting 
FID independently.   
Thus far, the use of conventional U.S. Naval forces to conduct FID has 
been discussed only theory.  In reality, the U.S. Navy must address several 
restraints before conventional forces can conduct FID and NECC support to 
Colombia becomes a reality.  The next chapter will discuss the particular 
restraints that would prevent conventional U.S. Naval forces from conducting FID 
in Colombia.   
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V. PARTICULAR RESTRAINTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From a military standpoint, using conventional U.S. Naval Forces in FID 
missions would only require an order to start moving forces in that direction.  
However, numerous restraints would prevent conventional U.S. Naval Forces 
from executing this mission.  The first restraint deals strictly with the U.S Navy 
and involves manning the units and finding personnel, mission specific training, 
cultural awareness, and language training.  The second restraint is the legacy of 
human rights abuses in Latin America associated with the military.  Third, is U.S. 
law, specifically the Leahy Amendment, enacted to promote human rights issues 
in return for U.S. sponsored military assistance.  The fourth restraint deals with 
the use of JCETS based on U.S. Army SOF experiences and the challenges they 
have encountered.  
1. U.S. Naval Force Manning and Personnel Structure 
With the exception of EOD, Seabees and NAVELSG have separate officer 
career paths that allow for easy transfer between similar units within specialties.  
The remainder of NECC units: Riverine, MESF, MCA, etc., are staffed with 
Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), naval designator code 1110, who volunteer to 
execute a tour of duty outside their traditional career path.  In a Riverine 
Squadron, for example, there are 14 SWOs, with ranks from Lieutenant junior 
grades (0-2) through Commander (O-5).82  The average tour length is from 18 to 
24 months, and during this time, an officer receives training in mission planning, 
expeditionary combat skills, and other mission specific training depending on 
 
82 Ensign’s (O-1) are not assigned to Riverine or MESF directly upon commissioning and 
must report to a surface combatant to complete their initial qualifying tour prior to reporting.  Also 
officers assigned within Surface nuclear power community are not assigned to NECC units as 
junior officers. 
their position in the unit.83  These officers will complete, at most, one training 
cycle and one deployment before transferring back into the conventional naval 
forces to keep with the Surface Warfare traditional career path (Figure 9).  
Officers who do not choose to follow the single out of mainstream tour 
recommendation and take a second assignment in NECC risk not screening for 
career Surface Warfare milestones, such as Command at Sea.  Sailors who fail 
to screen for a Surface Warfare milestone tour will not promote to the next pay 
grade. This normally leads to a resignation from service or retirement.  Those 
experienced officers who choose not to remain in NECC and remain in the 
mainstream Surface community have an opportunity to return.  Only after a SWO 
has completed two surface department head tours would they be able return to 
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Figure 8.   SWO Detailing Guidelines (After Surface Warfare Community Brief, 
2008) 
                                            
83 The Surface Warfare officer track allow for an 18-24 months second division officer tour 
prior to a shore command.   
84 “Surface Warfare Officer Community Brief,” www.npc.navy.mil (accessed May 8, 2008). 
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Another reason for only one off track tour is a shortage of officers at the 
mid-grade level (LCDR (O4) and above) to fill critical Surface Warfare billets 
ashore (Figure 10).  Experienced NECC officers who chose to remain in the IW 
force are not considered to be serving in critical Surface Warfare assignments. 
Although IW assignments are important, they represent a lower priority because 
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FY 08 OPA ENS LTJG LT LCDR CDR CAPT
O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6
DoD Flow Point Guidelines
Inventory vs. FY08 OPA
Rank OPA Inventory Delta Last Month
O1               909          1564            655            624
O2              1010         1364            354            352 
O3              1708         2209            501            485
O4              1373         1178           
FY08 Accessions-to-Date
(195)          (167)
 (271)          (272)
(116)          (115)
O5              1028          757           
O6               502           386
Total          6530         7458            928            907
OPA Does Not Reflect Junior Officer Requirements 
 
Figure 9.   SWO Community Shortfalls (From Surface Warfare Officer Community 
Brief, 2008) 
If conventional U.S. Navy forces are going to successfully execute FID 
missions in Colombia, the U.S. Navy must find a way to maximize an officer’s 
training and experience as well as retain qualified officers in NECC commands.  
While not perfect within the junior to mid-grade enlisted ranks, E-1 through E-6, 
the U.S. Navy does achieve minimum tour maximization.  Enlisted personnel that 
 
                                            
85 “Surface Warfare Officer Community Brief,” www.npc.navy.mil (accessed May 8, 2008). 
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are assigned to NECC units for three to five years and have the opportunity to 
train and deploy at least twice, using previous experiences to improve their skills 
and enhance unit readiness.     
a. Culture and Language Training Shortfalls 
Officer and enlisted personnel assigned to IW forces conducting 
FID will essentially be advisors, just like their SOF counterparts, but in a 
conventional sense.  As U.S. Army LtCol. Mark Grdovic notes, an “advisor’s 
success is in his ability to achieve ‘an unnoticed influence’ for the ultimate 
purposes of furthering the…national security objectives of the advisor’s 
government.”86  Grdovic argues that advisors assisting a host-nation must 
establish a “rapport, credibility, and perception by the host-nation forces of the 
continued valve of the relationship.”87  This will not happen overnight, as SOF 
advisors have been operating in Latin America and Colombia for decades. This is 
new territory for conventional naval forces.  While conventional U.S. naval forces 
have a long tradition of operations with foreign navies, the situation is quite 
different on the ground.  Many of the challenges that NECC forces will encounter 
are intangible, in naval circles, and require naval leaders to be very flexible and 
able to face unfamiliar events.   As Grdovic states, “an advisor must possess 
knowledge beyond that of a normal soldier, in this case sailor, in order to be 
effective…but also possess skills needed to impart his advice to a foreign 
counterpart in order to achieve the desired effect.”88  This can only be effective if 
conventional U.S. Naval forces receive culture and language training prior to 
arriving in Colombia.  General Mattis’ stated that cultural training would take at 
least three years, but this in fact is a very aggressive statement.89  
 
86 Mark Grdovic, “The Advisor Challenge,” Special Warfare 21, issue 1 (2008) 
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/ assets/ 08Jan.pdf (accessed September 15, 2008). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Bennet, “Mattis: Irregular War Must be a Core Competency.”  
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Actual cultural training could be achieved in as little as one month.  
However, it is the ability to master the native language and effectively 
communicate ideas that will lead to success CT or CI environments. This training 
is essential, but takes time, thus delaying the success of any mission.  Only by 
addressing the shortfalls in language training will IW forces be effective.   For 
example, the basic Spanish language course at the Defense Language Institute 
(DLI) in Monterey, CA, is six months long.  Based on the fiscal year 2009 
schedule, DLI offers five classes, with an average of 30 students per class.  
Assuming training started with the first class of the year, and we selected only 
one of three Riverine Squadrons to attend, every seat would be filled for all the 
class quotas for an entire year.  This also assumes that no other NECC units will 
need to receive language training and every other service is willing to give up 
their quotas.  Achieving the basic language skills to function as advisors in 
Colombia will take at least five years, assuming personnel remain assigned to 
NECC units after training.90      
2. Human Rights Abuses 
The 2008 Amnesty International Report, ‘Leave Us in Peace’: Targeting 
Civilians in Colombia’s Internal Armed Conflict, remarks that “Colombia’s internal 
armed conflict has pitted the security forces and paramilitaries against guerrilla 
groups for more than 40 years.  It has been marked by extraordinary levels of 
human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), with 
civilians by far the principal victims.”  The Amnesty International report estimates 
that some 700,000 civilians have been killed, some 30,000 have disappeared, 
20,000 have been kidnapped, and over 4 million people have been forcibly 
displaced in the past 40 years of Colombia’s internal conflict.91   
 
90 U.S. Joint Staff (2003), Language and Regional Expertise Planning, CJCSI 3126.1, 
January 23, 2006, chap. 1. 
91 Amnesty International Report, ‘Leave Us in Peace!’ Targeting Civilians in Colombia’s 
Internal Conflict, Amnesty International Publications, (2008), 6-7, 
http://www.amnestyinternational.org (accessed April 24, 2009). 
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The perception in Latin America will be such that while conducting FID 
missions, the training provided could lead to increased human rights abuses 
within the host nation.92  Despite the best intentions of conventional U.S. Naval 
forces, any human rights violations committed by Colombian security forces will 
reflect badly on the U.S. mission. This issue must be counteracted when 
discussing U.S. military training of any foreign military.  Inevitably, the media will 
fuel the fear that U.S. military training is aiding human rights abuses and 
atrocities.  This is especially true when training involves a Latin American nation.       
3. School of the Americas (SOA) 
The School of the Americas (SOA) was founded after World War II in 
Panama and relocated to Fort Benning, Georgia, in the early 1990s.93  Countries 
from all over Latin America have sent officers to the United States for training 
and some of those officers had “less than stellar human rights records,” 
according to Amnesty International.94  
At the time, the U.S. argued that Latin American countries suffering from 
human rights abuses and lacking mechanisms of  civilian control were in need of 
what was called “military professionalization.”  Katherine McCoy notes “SOA was 
considered to be a premier school for Latin American forces on the road to 
professionalization.”95 
In the 1970s and 1980s, several newspapers in Latin America claimed 
that SOA was teaching torture techniques and that students were practicing their 
skills on homeless people in the their nations, resulting in the media referring to 
the SOA as the School of Coups.96  The negative publicity the SOA received was 
 
92 Katherine E. McCoy, “Trained to Torture? The Human Rights Effects of Military Training at 
the School of the Americas,” Latin American Perceptives, 32, no. 6 (2005), 49. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 48. 
95 All direct quotes are taken from McCoy, “Trained to Torture?” 49. 
96 Ibid. 
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due in part to a few members of its alumni who were responsible for and later 
charged with human right abuses in their countries.  This stigma, which continues 
to this day, ultimately left the United States in an awkward position.  While the 
school did not condone human rights abuses, it was perceived by the public, both 
in the United States and Latin America, to be a school that graduated future 
dictators and human rights abusers.  In fact, they conducted training in 
professional military ethics, rules of law and war and taught courses in human 
rights.97  SOA was renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2001 and reinvented itself as a military educational 
institute offering effective training on democracy, ethics, and human rights in 
keeping with the democratic principles of the charter of the Organization of the 
American States (OAS).98     
In an additional effort to mitigate the U.S. military’s involvement in what 
has being seen as support for spreading human rights abuses through U.S. 
military training, the U.S. Congress started investigating and as a result enacted 
the Leahy Amendment. 
4. Leahy Amendment 
The Leahy Amendment of 1998 is a U.S. Congressional provision that 
makes aid to countries conditional on their bringing renegade members of the 
security forces to justice.  In 1997, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy sponsored 
legislation prohibiting U.S. military assistance to foreign military units that have 
violated human rights.99  This legislation has become a powerful legal method for 
promoting humans rights in order to receive U.S. security assistance.  The Leahy 
Amendment initially applied only to counter narcotics programs but was 
expanded in 1997 to include all security assistance programs, specifically training 
 
97 McCoy, “Trained to Torture?” 49. 
98 WHINSEC, Democracy, Ethics and Human Rights at the Western Hemisphere Institute of 
Security Cooperation, 1. 
99 Limitations on Assistance to Security Forces, 1. 
 44
                                           
programs sponsored by the Department of Defense (DOD).100  In 2001, the 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Sec. 563 of P.L. 106-429) stated that: 
None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to 
any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of 
State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross 
violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and 
reports to the Committee on Appropriations that the government of 
such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible 
members of the security forces to justice.101      
This provision was extended to include the DOD Appropriations Act of 
2001, as the DOD was responsible for training and assistance foreign country 
security forces.  The Appropriations Act stated: 
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to 
support any training program involving a unit of the security forces 
of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received 
credible for the Department of State that a member of such unit has 
committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all the 
necessary corrective step have been taken.102 
However, the DOD version of the Leahy Law allows the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) to waive this provision.  The SECDEF must submit a detailed 
report to Congress and disclose any information regarding human rights 
violations.103   The Leahy Law resulted in a vetting process that reviews the 
backgrounds of units and personnel that receive U.S. security assistance 
training.  This process is managed and monitored by every U.S. embassy in the 
world.  In Colombia’s case, the Leahy Law is strictly enforced, and anyone who 
fails to meet the requirements is removed from the program.104    
 
100 Limitations on Assistance to Security Forces, 1. 
101 Ibid., 2. 
102 Ibid., 1. 
103 Ibid., 1. 
104 Ibid. 
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The Leahy Law represents a special challenge to U.S. Military forces 
training and advising Colombian military forces. As conventional U.S. Naval 
forces start conducting FID, the Leahy Law will be tested.  With legal restrictions 
such as the Leahy Amendments, military forces in Colombia are restricted to 
advising and training in a non-combat role only after every single Colombian 
Service member is screened and cleared.  It could take several years to 
investigate and screen the Colombian personnel before training could start.    
5. JCETS – Only a Temporary Solution 
Once the decision is made to use conventional U.S. Naval force to 
conduct FID, the responsibility for training and approving IW forces will 
undoubtedly involve U.S Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which is  
solely responsible for all FID operations conducted by U.S. forces.  To that end, 
once designated U.S. Naval personnel or units from the IW forces have been 
trained and qualified, the next logical step is for those personnel to be included in 
a JCET.   
As John Rudy and Ivan Eland note, the JCET program “allows the military 
to pursue an almost independent policy, free of congressional or presidential 
limitations that apply to every other military aid and training program.”105  While 
the U.S. Embassy in a host nation is responsible for screening host nation 
personnel receiving training, it often includes missions involving JCETS despite 
DoD assurances that vetting of personnel is taking place.106 
When conventional U.S. Naval forces are added to JCETs in larger 
numbers, their presence will draw attention to loop holes in the program and 
require a response.  Congressional oversight concerning conventional U.S forces 
conducting FID will come under scrutiny, and Congress could see this as an 
 
 
105 Rudy and Eland, “Special Operations Military Training Abroad and Its Dangers,” 5. 
106 Ibid. 
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opportunity to reign in the SOF community and require SOF to do more reporting 
on its activities.107  Another program will have to be created in order to include 
IW forces in any FID missions.   
B. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has identified five constraints on the use of U.S. Navy in FID 
in Colombia. These include U.S. Naval Force manning and personnel, Human 
Rights abuses, the Leahy Amendment and the use of JCETS.  Of these 
constraints, the one that will be most difficult to overcome is manning and 
personnel because it will require a radical restructuring of U.S. Naval Forces to 
include assignments, promotions and career paths for both officers and enlisted 
personnel.  
The final chapter will provide common ground recommendations on how 
successful FID operations can be conducted despite the particular restraints to 
U.S. forces and assist the Colombian government in strengthening its security 
efforts. 
 
107 Rudy and Eland, “Special Operations Military Training Abroad and Its Dangers,” 9. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
While the restraints noted in Chapter V represent unique challenges to 
conventional U.S. Naval forces conducting FID, they do not completely prevent 
IW forces from taking on this critical mission.  As stated earlier, General Mattis is 
correct; we should be conducting FID.  It will take some time before conventional 
U.S. Naval forces could be adequately trained; however, the current force 
structure for the U.S. Navy invalidates General Mattis’ remarks.  Human capital 
and lessons learned must be maximized in order for FID to be successful.  The 
only way to achieve long-term success is to transform the current U.S. Naval 
force structure.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
1. Establish an NECC Community  
The U.S. Navy must fully embrace IW, acknowledge its critical role in the 
National and Maritime Strategy, and establish NECC as a stand-alone force 
within the Navy.  NECC must be given control over personnel, equipment, its 
budget—similar to the  aviation or submarine communities.  Once IW is 
recognized as a combat arm of the naval service, NECC can develop career 
paths and appropriate IW training of officers and enlisted personnel to ensure 
qualified personnel are assigned to FID missions in Colombia.  With a focus on 
FID missions, NECC can ensure that personnel receive language, culture, and 
technical training and are held to the highest standards.  This will allow NECC to 
take full advantage of its human capital by leveraging the experiences and 
capabilities of its personnel and units, capturing lessons learned, and ensuring 
that FID missions are conducted to maximize both U.S. and host nation 
capabilities.          
2. Establish a Regional Affairs Section within NECC 
 Within NECC, a Regional Affairs Section should be created and modeled 
after the U.S. Army Special Forces Groups with each having a specific 
geographic area of responsibility: Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Figure 
10).  However, unlike the Special Forces version, NECC Region Sections should 
not have tactical control of IW forces.  Rather, they should act as regional subject 
matters experts and have administrative control over force operation within their 
designated areas. Each Regional Affairs Section should be led by a Navy 
Captain (O-6) or senior Commander (O-5), manned appropriately to coordinate 
regional activities, and be responsible for engagement with the U.S Embassies. 
They should also track current operations within nations in their section and 
assist IW forces working with host nations.  Coordination with other agencies, 
embassies, and non-governmental organizations will be a critical part of FID 
operations.  Maritime security efforts with host nations must be deconflicted and 














Figure 10.    Proposed Regional Affairs Section 
 48
 49
 The Regional Affairs Sections could also track and monitor personnel 
requirements within NECC in order to maintain adequate levels of regional 
experts with language, cultural training, and regional experience.  Regional 
Affairs sections could also establish requirements and standards for future 
regional missions and develop requirements for the NECC commander.   
3. Engage the U.S. Congress Early 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) should begin preparing members of 
Congress with briefs on how IW forces will be used compared to conventional 
forces.  The CNO should identify areas such as manpower, human rights 
considerations, and training for both U.S. and host nation forces.  These briefs 
should also address Congressional concerns by asking for a JCET type program 
that will allow IW forces to work jointly with SOF and host nation security forces. 
This will ensure that training objectives are met while maintaining the highest 
standards in order to prevent human rights abuses. 
4. Develop a Joint Irregular Warfare Doctrine 
Before conventional U.S. Naval forces embark on FID operations, a 
comprehensive joint doctrine for IW should be drafted and published.  The U.S. 
Navy should take the lead on developing the concepts, terms, and means of 
employment for IW forces in order to avoid mission creep and confusion among 
the services.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS: COLNAV AND COLMAR FORCES 
The COLNAV and COLMAR forces in Colombia continue to ‘close the 
gaps’ in their naval strategy.  U.S. IW forces could best assist the Colombians by 
filling in the gaps in logistical, training, and headquarter roles within the 
Colombian military.  Both U.S. and Colombian personnel benefit by allowing 
NECC personnel to fill these critically needed positions (in non-combat roles). 
Both the COLNAV and COLMAR would have the opportunity to focus on 
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executing their roles in the naval strategy while simultaneously receiving training 
and support from U.S. personnel.  The training, logistics, and support provided by 
IW forces could strengthen Colombian efforts against drugs and insurgency, thus 
greatly bolstering security in the region.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
1. Crawl, Walk, Run—Include NECC Forces into SOF JCETS 
Special Forces will always work in conjunction with conventional forces in 
modern conflict as part of a larger campaign.  Integration of both IW forces and 
SOF in FID should be no different.  By allowing NECC forces to “bolt on” to JCET 
missions and provide extended support to host nations while allowing Special 
Forces teams access to the unique capabilities of NECC, units will accomplish a 
broader spectrum of FID.  Not every JCET will need IW force integration, but in 
the cases where a host nation has a need to strengthen their maritime 
capabilities, introduction of IW forces would be beneficial.  JCETS can also be 
used by SOCOM as an evaluation mechanism to ensure that IW forces are 
conducting FID missions in a format keeping with SOCOM standards.  This 
evaluation process could take multiple successful deployments of IW forces to 
achieve. However, it affords SOCOM and the U.S. Navy time to assess the 
effectiveness of conventional naval forces and provide an avenue for corrective 
action as necessary.   
Conventional U.S. Naval forces have a foundation from which to start 
operating as an independent force.  However, in order to establish a competent 
core of IW forces capable of working within host nations, these recommendations 
should be considered.  These recommendations cannot be implemented in 
series, but must occur in parallel if FID missions conducted by IW forces are 
going to be successful. 
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